Cities around the world are rapidly adopting digital technologies, data analytics, and the trappings of "smart" infrastructure. These innovations are touted as solutions to help rationalize services and address rising urban challenges, whether in housing, transit, energy, law enforcement, health care, waste management, or population flow. Promises of urban innovation unite cities ' need for help with technology firms ' need for markets and are rarely subject to evidentiary burdens about projected benefits (let alone costs). For the city, being smart is about functioning better and attracting tech plaudits. For the technology company, the smart city is a way to capture the value of data flows-either by directly monetizing behavioral insights or by using those insights to design or acquire services-and then realizing the network effects and monopoly rents that have characterized information technology platforms.
Introduction
On Toronto's eastern waterfront, a mile from the city center, there is a twelve-acre, L-shaped plot of land that would come to be known as Quayside. The property is largely owned by Waterfront Toronto (WT), a development corporation established in 2001 by the Government of Canada, the Province of Ontario, and the City of Toronto to assist in the renewal of Toronto's waterfront.2 Quayside came to international attention on October 17, 2017, when Sidewalk Labs-a wholly owned subsidiary of the Google conglomerate Alphabet Inc.-became the official "innovation and funding partner" for the site.3 As such, it was tasked with helping to "create peoplecentred neighbourhoods that achieve precedent-setting levels of sustainability, affordability, mobility, and economic opportunity" at Quayside and, more significantly, to potentially scale its ideas to the vastly more substantial 880-acre eastern Lands public redevelopment area adjacent to the site.4 With Sidewalk's involvement, the small and otherwise unremarkable patch of postindustrial land at Quayside quickly became the centerpiece of a heated debate, nationally and internationally, about innovation, privatization, privacy, surveillance, control, and the future of cities and urban life.
There was a certain giddiness to the relationship between Waterfront Toronto and Sidewalk Labs, evident not only in the proliferation of brightly hued concept papers and public demonstrations imagining new infrastructure for the site5 but also in the speed with which foundational agreements about the relationship between the parties and the bounds of the project were consummated-all outside of public view. According to Ontario's provincial auditor, the Board of Waterfront Toronto was given mere days to discuss and understand the implications of the initial "Framework Agreement" with Sidewalk, dated October 16, 2017, before being asked to approve it.6 It did so under intense pressure, given that the prime minister, the premier, and the mayor had all been lined up to make the announcement public only days later.7 Waterfront Toronto and Sidewalk kept this original Framework Agreement secret, apart from the release of a short summary.8
Even Toronto city officials were kept in the dark as concerns about ownership and governance percolated and the project attracted intense public interest and media attention.9 It took nine-and-a-half months for the parties to release more details in another superseding agreement, the "Plan 11. See Auditor Report, supra note 6, at 653 ("The Province lacks a policy framework to guide the development of a mixed-use smart city such as the one being contemplated for Quayside.").
12. City of Toronto, Waterfront Strategic Review 10 (2015), https:// www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2015/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-81763.pdf[https://perma.cc/ 26AU-8KRX] [hereinafter Waterfront Strategic Review]; see also City of Toronto, Review of Imagination, Manufacturing, Innovation and Technology Property Tax Incentive Program 5 (2018), https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2018/ex/bgrd/ oversight capacity, which it exercises through the ability to select board members, only two of whom may be public officials.13 WT owns most of the land on the twelve-acre Quayside site, with the hundreds of acres of adjacent waterfront lands mostly owned by the City of Toronto.14 Leveraging its modest real estate interest and comparatively larger redevelopment role, WT announced in the spring of 2017 an audacious vision to transform Quayside into a "globally significant demonstration project that advances a new market model for climate-positive urban developments"-"an exemplar of best practices and breakthrough solutions of global significance" that it saw as a "pilot environment" and "first step towards the longer-term vision for the broader eastern waterfront revitalization."15 Whereas WT had previously pursued incremental mixed-use developments, it was now pivoting to an ambitious wholesale approach and seeking an "innovation" partner as a "co-master developer" to do it.16 By this point, it was already in discussions with Alphabet-Sidewalk, whose executives were in conversation with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau.17
A. The Beginning: From Request for Proposals to the Framework Agreement
On March 17, 2017, WT issued its request for proposals (RFP) to identify a firm to create a "precedent-setting waterfront community" as a "testbed for emerging technologies, materials and processes" on Toronto's eastern waterfront.18 It sought a partner to create an "overall vision" and to identify the "technologies, infrastructure, strategies, measurable outcomes and downstream partners" necessary to ensure the delivery of a "globally significant demonstration project" on the Quayside The RFP involved no guarantees as to volume of work and expressly provided that the agreement would not be an exclusive one.20 Sidewalk Labs LLC describes itself as an "urban innovation firm."21 Since the company's launch in June 20 1 5,22 it has focused on the research and development of pilot initiatives around digital connectivity and data-fueled community development, with the most prominent being its advertisingsupported Wi-Fi kiosk gambit on the streets of New York, LinkNYC.23 Both Sidewalk and WT have roots in failed Olympic bids. Dan Doctoroff, founding CEO of Sidewalk, headed NYC's bid for the 2012 Olympics.24 WT grew out of Toronto's bid for the 2008 Olympics.25 From Doctoroff s telling, the entities were destined for each other: Sidewalk was searching the world for a place to test its synthesis of digital and physical infrastructure when Quayside-and Toronto, "probably the most diverse large city in the world"26-came calling.27 For its part, WT was under some pressure to accelerate redevelopment after more than a decade of slow, but steady, progress.28 It also needed cash; with two decades of tripartite government funding coming to an end in 2020/21, the agency's finances were precarious and its ongoing existence under threat.29
Part of the story in Toronto is a divergence of opinion on the track record for waterfront redevelopment and WT's responsibility therefor. Doctoroff described what he viewed as a century of development failure and a hubristic "we alone can fix it" attitude at Sidewalk.30 By contrast, defenders of public 20. Id. at 28 ("The agreement to be negotiated with the selected Proponent will not be an exclusive contract for the provision of the described Partner Scope and Deliverables. Waterfront Toronto may contract with others for goods and services the same as or similar to the Partner Scope and Deliverables or may obtain such goods and services internally." identified significant strides (particularly in the commitment of substantial public funds to flood protection and environmental remediation) that would have been even greater absent austerity measures that had starved urban investment over the past several decades.31
It was in this context that WT received six submissions during the unusually short six-week period allotted for RFP responses.32 Acting without input from city staff, WT invited three firms to continue on to the second stage, at which point Sidewalk was selected.33 In its response, Sidewalk proposed projects involving autonomous transit, high-rise laminated timber buildings, and underground utility channels,34 and Sidewalk also promised to relocate Google's Canadian headquarters to the waterfront.35 A year later, Ontario's auditor general found that WT chose Sidewalk precipitously without adequately consulting the appropriate governmental entities.36 WT had first contacted Sidewalk about using Quayside as a pilot on June 27, 2016, ten months prior to issuing the RFP.37 In itself, this might not be concerning as WT seems to have approached a number of parties prior to the call. What distinguishes the Sidewalk contact is that it might have originated higher up. Indeed, Prime Minister Trudeau himself hinted at such a possibility, referring at the launch of Sidewalk Toronto to the former chairman of Google, stating, "Eric [Schmidt] . It is clear from freedom of information requests that these comments were unscripted. At the same event, Eric Schmidt said: "This is not some random activity from our perspective. This is the culmination of, on our side, almost ten years of thinking about how technology could improve the quality of people's lives." Id. at 43:33.
39. Framework Agreement, WATERFRONT TORONTO 1 (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/wcm/connect/waterfront/035e8adl-6ba2-46f6-8915-Toronto.40 WT released a four-page summary of this agreement on November 1, 2017,41 but the parties contracted to keep the full twenty-ninepage agreement confidential, sharing it with government staff only in a limited fashion.42 It is worth noting that both the Framework Agreement and Plan Development Agreement refer to several other agreements that have not been made public.43
The secrecy surrounding the Framework Agreement caused significant public pushback, as well as criticism from public officials. A quirk of WT's constitution means that it is not subject to freedom of information requests and it can make public only what it wants under a voluntary policy.44 This meant that even a freedom of information request on the confidentiality provision concerning the Framework Agreement was itself denied.45 So, the Framework Agreement was left a riddle wrapped in an enigma. Such secrecy might be unusual for a public authority, but it is not unusual for big tech and is a particularly favored strategy of Google. As of this writing, Google is trying to build a new city described as a Google "village" in San Jose, California, and has entered into a nondisclosure agreement with the city as it negotiates the land deal. 46 transparency.47 As in Toronto, the details of how development will happen and what the costs and benefits will be are unknown. The San Jose City Council went ahead and approved the sale.48 The Quayside Framework Agreement was an agreement to agree on a detailed overall master plan-the much referenced, but minimally elaborated, "Master Innovation and Development Plan" (MIDP)49 Ultimately, MIDP implementation would require necessary approvals and actions from the City of Toronto, including "planning, building and environmental approvals, right-of-way permits, road closings, real-estate transactions, and affordable housing requirements."50 Sidewalk agreed to provide funding of up to C$10 million for plan development and pilot projects prior to the achievement of certain "initial plan milestones" and another C$40 million after.51 The Framework Agreement makes clear that Sidewalk wears four hats: land developer, urban planner, technology specialist, and services vendor.52 This paper does not address the land development portion, except to note that the Framework Agreement neither assured Sidewalk of any land development rights nor precluded them in the future.53 There was, however, a clear connection between the land and Sidewalk: the company's continued involvement depended on a public contribution of C$1.25 billion in order for WT to complete a major flood protection project across the Port Lands, which would make the land viable for redevelopment.54 Full flood protection was accomplished in May 2018.55 It was not clearly apparent that Sidewalk's plan was a "real-estate play" until many months after the release of the Framework Agreement,56 when Sidewalk's internal discussions were leaked to the press.57 47 
B. Public Outrage: Between the Framework Agreement and the Plan Development Agreement
In the nine-and-a-half-month period following the announcement of the Sidewalk Toronto project, members of the public and public officials expressed concerns about data, secrecy, scope, the corporate role in planning, and the absence of public accountability. No one could figure out what Sidewalk's business plan was, how it would make money, how it would pay for the ambitious innovations it proposed, and what long-term commitments it was prepared to make to the city. Even the question of Sidewalk's ownership or role in managing real estate was ambiguous.
Sidewalk executed a remarkably effective public relations campaign, heralding its hope to "bend the curve on quality of life," particularly around affordability and sustainability.58 A major source of public concern was that a steward of public lands was creating public policy with, and via, a private vendor.59 Sidewalk ran "public roundtables" as citizen engagement events with the flavor, but not the actual accountability, of public hearings.60 Citing this and other aspects of Sidewalk's public relations work, which accounted for a sizeable portion of the C$50 million the company contributed to the project,61 the Canadian Civil Liberties Association called the whole process one of "governance by mercenary."62 At every stage, ambiguity, secrecy, and slipperiness have dogged the Sidewalk Toronto project.
Because Sidewalk is a Google-affiliated company, data issues were always going to be front and center. Experts immediately worried about surveillance.63 At first. Sidewalk handled issues of data collection, data control, and privacy by offering up general and vague 58. See, e.g., Dubner, supra note 26. 59. Bianca Wylie, Google Is Still Planning a 'Smart City' in Toronto Despite Major Privacy Concerns, Vice (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/xwkv9z/googleplanning-smart-city-toronto-despite-privacy-concerns [https://perma.cc/M2AU-7HPJ] ("Waterfront Toronto is... a public corporation making policy with a vendor."). 60. Id.; see also Auditor Report, supra note 6, at 707-08. 61. Bianca Wylie, Debrief on Sidewalk Toronto Public Meeting #3-A Master Class in Gaslighting and Arrogance, Medium (Aug. 19, 2018), https://medium.eom/@biancawylie/ debrief-on-sidewalk-toronto-public-meeting-3-a-master-class-in-gaslighting-and-arrogance-clc5dd918cl6 [https://perma.cc/V4B5-C6V8] (The PDA budgets "more than $11 million USD" for "communications, external affairs and engagement. . . . This program will'seek to ensure support for the master innovation and development plan among key constituents in Toronto.' . . . The residents'reference panel is being paid for and run by a corporation. That's called a focus group." (quoting PDA, supra note 10, at 34) principles (e.g., privacy by design, accountability, community benefit).64 It also made a particularly savvy hire, the former Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario Ann Cavoukian, whom it had retained along with other prominent privacy professionals to help it develop privacy and data use policies. The summary of the Framework Agreement said that the parties "plan to continue to develop a thoughtful 'Privacy by Design' policy"-a reference to the design framework for which Cavoukian is best known, but there were no details.65 Nothing about privacy or data appeared in the Framework Agreement itself. It took seven months, or until May 2018, before a high-level statement of guiding principles for data use emerged. Somewhat ironically, given the controversy over the project's secrecy, principles of transparency, proactive engagement, and community trust were chief among them. 66 Lead critics swiftly connected concerns over data to concerns over governance and to a fundamental challenge to autonomy and freedom in urban space. Bianca Wylie, cofounder of the technology advocacy group Tech Reset Canada, quickly became an authority, reporting comprehensively and expertly on the spawning project.67 Testifying before the Toronto City Council in January 2018, she argued that "the biggest issue is not privacy, it's governance."68 Wylie argued that we need to think about the "data infrastructure the way we think about critical physical infrastructure. It cannot be proprietary."69 Following this meeting, the executive committee of the council referred a request to the director of the Waterfront Secretariat, requesting that WT "[investigate the feasibility of establishing a democratically representative residents' advisory group with a fiduciary responsibility to look after residents' digital interests" and to have the goal that "[a]ll data collection should be anonymous by default"70-two elements that, at least before the release of the MIDP, did not further materialize. There was a growing recognition that the initial framing of the project had sidelined the question of first principles: should people be tracked in the public realm in the first place, and who should benefit? As Wylie put it, "[w]hen did we as a society say that however we move around in public space-that this is something we want to share and commodify?"71 A second aspect of studied ambiguity in the rollout of Sidewalk Toronto was the most basic issue of scope: the categorical difference between the twelve-acre Quayside plot and the 880-acre eastern waterfront, encompassing the Port Lands and surrounding area. In its RFP, WT scoped the project to the Quayside site but also framed the project as a pilot for revitalization of the broader eastern waterfront.72 The summary of the Framework Agreement stated that both Quayside and the eastern waterfront would be included in planning for the MIDP.73 A report prepared for the city council, by contrast, stated confidently that the MIDP "will address the 12acre Quayside site" and that "[i]t is premature for City Council to be making decisions about implementation related to the redevelopment of the Port Lands."74 The apparent tension between the summary document and the city's position created confusion; well into the project, "senior city officials were still expressing concerns" that WT was working with Sidewalk on the Port Lands when the officials thought the scope should be more limited.75 The ambiguity about land fed an anxiety that public assets were being sold short on the promises of a gleaming new city of the future.76 Sidewalk's investment of US$50 million began to look a little less generous once the public had invested C$1.25 billion to ready the Port Lands for development.77 WT's own limited financing at the time of the RFP award and its need to secure ongoing funds made Sidewalk's contribution seem larger than it was in comparison to what the public was contributing. 72. See RFP, supra note 15, at 6 (14[I]t may be beneficial to advance the solutions, processes and partnerships proven successfill through the Project to subsequent developments on the eastern waterfront."); see also Summary of Framework Agreement, supra note 41, at 4 (including visualizations).
73. See Summary of Framework Agreement, supra note 41, at 1. 74. See Tax Incentive Review, supra note 12, at 2. 75. Jeff Gray & Josh O'Kane, Waterfront Toronto, Sidewalk Labs Walk Back Plans in New Deal, Globe & Mail (July 31, 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/ canada/toronto/article-new-deal-between-waterfront-toronto-and-sidewalk-labs-walks-backsome/ [https://perma.cc/Y88L-ZGM9] (describing a letter from interim City Manager Giuliana Carbone to Waterfront Toronto calling for "more clarity around the city's role in approving any use of its land" and seeking an explicit statement that the project was for Quayside only).
76. Jamie Powell, Sidewalk Toronto: Delays andNDAs, Fin. Times: Alphaville (July 2, 2018), https://ftalphaville.ft.eom/2018/07/02/1530507600000/Sidewalk-Toronto--delaysand-NDAs/ [https://perma.cc/37PJ-FYDF] ("[T]he opportunity cost of leaving the waterfront site undeveloped until Google-fication is rolled out en masse theoretically totals billions of Canadian dollars.").
77. Memorandum from Serge Dupont to the Prime Minister of Can. (Feb. 21, 2017) (on file with authors) ("WT has indicated that it will be difficult to get a technology partner with deep pockets to commit to their smart city vision without a commitment by governments to fund the [Port Lands Flood Protection Project], which would provide a valuable location for the partner to scale up.").
Sidewalk's messaging about the economic value of Quayside suggested that the unimproved land was not worth all that much. While its book value for WT was only about C$40 million, the actual value was more than ten times this amount because the land had already been re zoned for the more desirable mixed-use development.78 This discrepancy only added to the sense that the project was moving too fast and returning to the public much less than full value.
Over the summer of 2018, the Sidewalk Toronto project was not proceeding smoothly. WT's CEO Will Fleissig resigned,79 forced out under pressure from the board.80 Several weeks later, and for entirely different reasons, one of WT's most prominent and experienced board members-real estate developer Julie Di Lorenzo-resigned, claiming that contractual provisions with Sidewalk (effectively requiring consensus positioning between WT and Sidewalk) prevented her from exercising her fiduciary duties over a project that had disappointed her from its commencement.81 She expressed dismay that Sidewalk had become WT's "filter . . . gatekeeper and . . . agent," that it was being permitted to operate outside of the agency's procurement protocol, and that numerous questions about digital governance and privacy remained unanswered.82 The Plan Development Agreement was signed immediately after Di Lorenzo's resignation.83 In addition, there were resignations from the new Digital Strategy Advisory Panel that WT had set up to advise on data issues, citing concerns about the lack of transparency, integrity, and trust in the process and parties involved.84
C. Emerging Scope: Between the Plan Development Agreement and the Master Innovation and Development Plan
On July 31, 2018, the Plan Development Agreement85 between WT and Sidewalk replaced the Framework Agreement, which was finally made 78. Mariana Valverde, Public Lands, Private Control, and Housing Needs in the 'Smart City' Quayside Development, Ctr. for Free Expression (Dec. 4, 2018), https:// cfe.ryerson.ca/blog/2018/12/public-lands-private-control-and-housing-needs-smart-cityquayside-development [https://perma.cc/P4LH-PE2Q] (noting that Quayside "as it is already zoned" is estimated to be worth "$500 to $600 million" public on the same day it became defunct. The published texts-of both the new and old agreements-offered for the first time some clarity on scope. In terms of land, the full text of the Framework Agreement revealed that the parties wanted the "solutions, processes and partnerships" developed at Quayside to be applied "to subsequent developments on the Eastern Waterfront, as those lands become available."86 Further, an express part of the work plan included "a process for the transfer and valuation of land for purposes of implementation of the MIDP."87 The PDA continued this theme, stating that the MIDP "will include both plans for the Quayside Parcel and plans at scale, including for the [eastern waterfront]," and acknowledging that this could extend to "lands not owned or controlled by the Parties."88 The clearest expression of scope appears in the exclusivity provisions of each agreement. Both the Framework Agreement and the PDA prohibited WT from investigating any other development of the entire eastern waterfront during the term of each respective agreement, i.e., until the MIDP was approved or the parties terminated the agreement.89 This period was envisaged in the PDA to extend to December 31, 2019, and potentially further,90 i.e., well over two years after Sidewalk won the RFP. This wasdespite the unambiguous provision in the RFP stating that WT would not be entering into an exclusivity arrangement with its innovation and funding partner91-a total change in position that accounts, perhaps, for some of the parties' confounding secrecy surrounding the agreements.
Three schedules of the PDA are of particular note: procurement, intellectual property (IP), and digital governance. One of the Framework Agreement's milestones for continued collaboration between Sidewalk and WT had been agreement on "fair and arms'-length procurement standards" on the site.92 The procurement schedule established that Sidewalk would control procurement before implementation of the MIDP at its option using competitive procedures or sole sourcing.93
After implementation, procurement standards would "seek to balance-in the public interest-the use of market-based sourcing, on the one hand, and the direct facilitation of development of the site would be a mix of competitive procurement and sole sourcing. What this means in practice is that Sidewalk, as the technology partner, would be in a position to create technology procurement needs for which it or another Alphabet-Google company would be a "Purposeful Solution" or a sole-source provider. Again, this is anomalous for WT, given the authority's statement that, "[s]ince inception, our funding agreements with our government partners have prohibited us from sole sourcing any contract more than $75,000."95 Moving to intellectual property, the intellectual property schedule addresses how the benefits of innovation connected to the project will be distributed between the parties. Here too, Sidewalk seems to be walking away with a sweet deal. The PDA is ambiguous about just who will own the data and insights generated by the Sidewalk Toronto project. The definition clause identifies that various types of intellectual property will be part of the project, including copyright material, IP in various products and services, potential patentable inventions, and brands. It also states that "[o]ther types of Intellectual Property may arise in the course of the MIDP, including data."96 This is followed by a clause substantially similar to what Google affiliates have used before with public partners.97 In setting out what is described as the "IP-related value drivers" brought by each partner to the project, the PDA notes that Sidewalk brings "its experiences and learnings accumulated in other markets" (limited, of course, given its youth).98 WT brings something rather more tangible: first, "a meaningful test bed and product/service trial venue at the MIDP Site" and second, "responsible access to datasets necessary or useful to the design or prototyping of Products and Services."99 Strikingly, only the test bed is recognized as a compensable contribution, with the goal being to ensure that the public is "reasonably compensated" for the opportunities provided by the test bed.100 By contrast, there is a notable silence about any compensation for access to datasets. This detail is a key plank of Sidewalk's data strategy and an important foundation for future developments. The short shrift given to WTfumished data contrasts with the express recognition that Sidewalk will have exclusive ownership of any IP that is generated on the site and not specified or required by the deal-what is termed in the agreement "Non-MIDP Site IP."101
The data questions become more interesting in connection with the schedule on digital governance, which sets out seven guiding digital design 95 principles-high-level aspirations for the collection and use of data in the project, which incorporate many best practices. The language is ambitious and borders on hyperbole. For example, one of the principles is to "create the most privacy protected/citizen-centered set of policies and governance structures in the world."102 Another, picking up a trend from Europe, is to "[ejxplore novel forms of data governance, such as ... an independent data trust with representation by both data subjects and citizens more generally."103 The principles also envisage
[n]ovel ownership structures for non-personal data, and associated open protocols and rules, to ensure public policy objectives are met, including access by and potential ownership of data by Waterfront Toronto, the City of Toronto, Province of Ontario or Government of Canada or other such third parties as deemed appropriate by the Parties.104
It is not clear how this schedule interacts overall with the provisions just outlined in the intellectual property schedule, but the PDA does provide that "[d]ata ownership will be addressed in greater detail through the MIDP.105 Some months after the release of the PDA, and one full year after the RFP was awarded, Sidewalk elaborated on its data governance vision with what it called a "Civic Data Trust" for the Sidewalk Toronto project.106 Under the proposal, all data collected for the first time (or, we might say, "natively") in the physical space of the MIDP site would be classed as "Urban Data," and all access to, and use of, this data would be mediated by the Civic Data Trust, which would treat all applications-from Sidewalk or anyone else-on the same terms.107 In passing, the proposal distinguishes data collected through websites or mobile phones but does not expressly exclude or limit those sources if they are designed by Sidewalk or otherwise collecting native or original data. 108 Using the mechanism of a trust, what Sidewalk really seemed to be proposing was to unilaterally redefine all data collected within the MIDP site as Urban Data-from public spaces and from private ones, including apartments, homes, and offices "not controlled by those who occupy them" 102. Id. at 47-48. 103. See id. at 47 ("The trust could carry a fiduciary responsibility to serve and balance data subject and public interest within a framework that treats privacy from both a public as well as a private good perspective." 108. See Sidewalk Labs, supra note 106, at 14 ("Urban Data is anchored to geography, unlike data collected through websites and mobile phones, and lends itself to local governance.").
(i.e., including any leased space or anywhere offered "as a service").109 This sleight of hand, creating a term unrecognized in law, would effectively negate any default privacy setting: everything done within the bounds of the Sidewalk Toronto project would be potentially up for grabs.110 Sean McDonald warned, "proposing that Toronto should base ownership determinations on the urbanity of a data set is a departure from Canadian data ownership law and a precedent that, if approved, could extend far beyond this project."111 Sidewalk recommended that Urban Data should be "de identified" by default, presumably by those collecting the data.112 It also offered platitudes that the trust mechanism "would be on top of-not in place of-existing law, regulation, and government enforcement."113 For all that, it is notable that the trust mechanism envisaged no limits on data collection or use, nor did it ensure that there would be surveillance-free zones.114 De identification is a flea on the back of the elephant of data collection. Further, and radically, the proposal takes the position that all de-identified data (notwithstanding the problems associated with that concept) should be "open, free, and available" by default-under a self-certification scheme that involves no substantive review.115 This is the flea goading the elephant on a rampage.
Experts question whether the trust has any basis in Canadian law,116 and though it was proposed to ameliorate Sidewalk's monopolization of data, the 109. Id. Sidewaik explains that "Urban Data is data collected in a physical space in the city." Id. This includes: "[p]ublic spaces, such as streets, squares, plazas, parks, and open spaces"; "[p]rivate spaces accessible to the public, such as building lobbies, courtyards, ground-floor markets, and retail stores"; and "[p]rivate spaces not controlled by those who occupy them (e.g. apartment tenants)." Id. Sidewalk describes three types of Urban Data: (1) data "[c]ollected in the public realm (e.g. pedestrian counters, street-facing cameras)," (2) data "[c]ollected in privately-owned but publicly accessible spaces. . . e.g. cameras," and (3) data "[cjollected in fully private spaces, generally homes or offices (e.g. thermostats, home security cameras, sensors for building code compliance)." Id. at 16.
110. Sean McDonald, Toronto, Civic Data, and Trust, Medium (Oct. 17, 2018), https://medium.eom/@McDapper/toronto-civic-data-and-trust-ee7ab928fb68 [https://perma.cc/ST49-G645] ("The proposal advocates for Toronto to specially consider 'urban' data as a unique category, which is then treated differently-here, 'urban' data would be declared a 'public asset,' and then published. . . . Proposing quasi-nationalization of data is a big deal. . . ."). 01/what-data-trust-and-why-are-we-even-talking-about-itsidewalk-labs'-magic-tricks [https://perma.cc/9QJJ-59A5] ("[D]e-identifying data doesn't make it public, it just steers commercialization into certain channels; and making privately owned data sets available doesn't make them publicly owned."); see also Toronto Region Bd. of Trade, BiblioTech: Beyond Quayside; A City-Building Proposal for the proposal provided no defense against the company effectively enclosing the benefits of a data commons using a dominant position in data collection and analytics.117 One of the characteristics of vendor-made policy is that it need not tie in with other governmental efforts. So here, it is unclear how a data trust into which all public data is deposited fits in with Toronto's existing Open Data Master Plan,118 for example, or the work that Ontario and Canada are undertaking on comprehensive data laws.
Even more fundamentally, the trust proposal distracts from the first-order questions. Of these, the very first is: why is a vendor making policy? Next, asked an observer, "why are we collecting any data at all?"119 And finally, what happened to privacy by design? Within four days of the announcement of the Civic Data Trust, Sidewalk's most prominent privacy defender, Ann Cavoukian, resigned because she said Sidewalk had reneged on its promise that all data would be de-identified at the source.120 Her departure over such a basic feature of data flows, fully one year into the project, showed just how undeveloped or at least undisclosed the data policies were.121
The capstone to the interregnum between the PDA and MIDP releases was the accidental revelation, finally, of Sidewalk's business plan. Investigative news reports broke on February 14, 2019, six months after release of the PDA, that Sidewalk had been meeting regularly with government officials to preview its real estate play in the Port Lands.122 It proposed to finance rail infrastructure on the eastern waterfront in return for a cut of property taxes,123 arguing that it is "entitled to ... a share in the uptick in land value on the entire geography . . . [and] a share of developer charges and incremental tax revenue on all land."124 Sidewalk's ambition for scale had been apparent, 122. Oved, supra note 14. 123. Id.; see also Framework Agreement, supra note 39, § 34 (In anticipation this strategy, "[t]he parties will explore financing mechanisms that monetize the future economic impacts (including through adjustments in tax assessments and other public fees) to sponsor infrastructure.").
124. Oved, supra note 14.
but oblique.125 Within the space of a year and with no public engagement, Sidewalk had seemingly abandoned its reassurances that the scope of the project was modest and "additive,"126 that it would proceed slowly from proven testing, piloting, and stakeholder engagement at Quayside, and that "geography can be a discussion after the plan is finished."127 The news that February morning revealed something far more audacious: Sidewalk CEO Dan Doctoroff s assertion that "if there is no light rail through the project, then the project is not interesting to us"128 and the plan for the neverpreviously discussed Villiers Island to house a thirty-four-to-forty-six-acre Google development.129 Meanwhile, on Toronto's information page on "Current Projects" for the Waterfront Secretariat, the Sidewalk Toronto project continued to be referred to as restricted to Quayside, to twelve-acres, and to a carefully bound scope,130 with no mention of the entire site.
To recap what we learned during the first eighteen months of the Sidewalk Toronto project:
(1) A public authority partnered with a big tech company to scope out a new urban district. The initial terms of the collaboration were kept secret from the public and public officials for nine-and-a-half months. The terms of the evolving MIDP, which will ultimately govern the project, were secret for at least eighteen months.
(2) The process for public engagement was staged and managed by the company, with the public as well as relevant public officials kept out of key consultations.
(3) During the working out of plan details, the public invested C$1.25 billion on real property improvements, while at the same time the public authority was contractually precluded from considering other developers, despite it having solicited proposals on the express condition that the agreement was nonexclusive.
(4) Within the geographic bounds of the project, which pivoted from a mere twelve-acres to a sprawling 880-acres, the tech company unilaterally redefined all data collected natively from the site as "Urban Data," subject to rule by a poorly defined Civic Data Trust.
(5) Numerous resignations of high-profile advisors to the project and public opposition did not slow down the process or cause a rethinking of the whole approach, which moved on despite there being inadequate policies in place to deal with data governance, procurement, intellectual property, and many other fundamental aspects of the project.
II. Sidewalk's Platform Governance Problems
We now turn from the troubled launch of the Sidewalk Toronto project to the main dangers of such a venture, if realized, to democratic governance. To some degree, this substantive critique stands on its own, independent of the secrecy and slipperiness of the launch process. But in other respects, the initial process deficiencies represent and intensify concerns related to the imagined city. After describing Sidewalk's vision for Toronto's smart city platform, based principally on a close reading of the vision section of Sidewalk's submitted response to the RFP,im as elaborated in public statements over the first eighteen months of the project, we identify three major pitfalls for the public: privatization, platformization, and domination.
A. The City as Platform: Sidewalk's Vision
One of the central rhetorical pivots of Sidewalk's imaginings for the Toronto waterfront is what it terms the "digital layer." The digital layer is an animating idea for the project, rather than a material reality.131 132 The digital layer runs through, under, and around the "physical layer" of the built environment. It consists of data and the things data touches, like sensors and cameras, data analytics and storage, wireless and wired infrastructure, and portals and devices. The digital layer is in essence Sidewalk's version of the "platform concept," which creates "the baseline conditions for urban innovation."133 With the use of this language, Sidewalk explicitly adopts the metaphor of the "city as platform"134 and invites the city itself to emulate the 131. 133. Vision, supra note 131, at 17. 134. This formulation has been used elsewhere as an analytical frame for digitally networked urban governance. See generally, e.g., David Bollier, Aspen Inst., The City as platform technology companies like Amazon and Google that cities hope to attract.135 136 Sidewalk sells the digital layer as the engine for the edge innovation, the startups, and the tech businesses of the silicon idyll.
Figure 1: The City as Platform136
In the idealized city as platform, ubiquitous sensors will feed data into automated street design, turning streets as needed into conduits for bikes or pedestrians or priority vehicles. Data will enable flexible use of streets, buildings, and pubhc space as changing demands are sensed and datafied. Responsive applications built on top of the platform can efficiently deliver services (from food to sanitation to work space) "just-in-time" for pubhc consumption. The platform design explicitly recapitulates the internet's network architecture:
Just as computer and smartphone operating systems keep the device miming smoothly but also allow innovators to create new apps, the digital layer is designed to keep the city miming smoothly but also encourage residents, staff, startups, and larger companies to bring their most creative ideas to bear on improving life in the city. Indeed, in 2016, Sidewalk analogized the city to the network stack of a computer operating system, in which citizen services and even city administration itself become just user-facing applications, driven through the digital layer.138 139 This is "public administration as app," with policy and accountability pushed to the edge of a network run on infrastructure owned and operated by someone else. Sidewalk's vision for Toronto's eastern waterfront is a network of neighborhoods "networked ... to operate at a system scale, like the internet, generating advantages that increase with each new node."140 The internet, as a network of networks, confers obvious connectivity advantages. But what is the advantage of networked neighborhoods when one of the meanings of neighborhood is to be distinct and set apart? In Sidewalk's vision, it is to attract businesses to supply goods and services through the platform. 'Whereas a neighbourhood of a few thousand people will produce a modest market opportunity to attract third parties to the platform, a district of networked neighbourhoods will be powerful enough to draw companies and entrepreneurs from all over to take part in Toronto Private functions like commerce, public ones like building inspections, and hybrid ones like housing or transportation are all mediated by data flows, predictive analytics, and automated decisions.
Urban governance is reconceptualized as facilitating the collection and transmission of data to applications and services that run on top of the platform.143 In effect, the city morphs from polls to bazaar, from a place of thick ties to thin transactions where digital bids connect people to services and applications.
R. Privatization
The marketplace model for the city highlights the business orientation of a project that from the start failed the first test of public administration: engaging the governed.144 Even with formal institutional approval at the outset, there is a danger that a project like Sidewalk Toronto achieves private gain at the expense of the public-incrementally but comprehensively, from planning to implementation. Above, we discussed IP ownership and data control, through which the privatization of pubhc assets can be achieved alongside old-fashioned land deals. Here, we turn to governance.
Hidden in Sidewalk's fine renderings of mass timber construction, adaptable roads, and configurable parks lies the most significant feature of the deal: the substantial delegation of public governance to a private platform. Whoever controls the "digital layer" of the city exerts control over the activities transacted through it. Sidewalk designed the digital layer and Sidewalk affiliates may operate it, intermediating access to traditional public spaces and services, like the curb, sidewalks, parks, and transport, as well as to private ones, like housing, health, and thermostats. As more and more of life is transacted through the digital layer, regulation and its reach are encoded in that layer, as discussed below.145 WT signaled out of the gate that it was willing to cede governance. Its RFP sought a partner to "create the required governance constructs to stimulate the growth of an urban innovation cluster, including legal frameworks (e.g., intellectual property, privacy, data sharing)."146 From the start, a public entity tasked a vendor, doing service also as developer and planner, with making pubhc policy. Among the most important levers of urban governance are planning, regulation, and enforcement.147 Sidewalk, 143. Another layer-the "standards layer"-^provides an interface between the digital layer and the "residents, administrators, and developers using and building atop the platform." Vision, supra note 131, at 18. 144. The public fora that Sidewalk Toronto hosted did not meet the mark. They skated over data collection, procurement, IP, and other issues, while focusing public attention on much less contested questions about building materials and amenities.
145. If code is law, then the digital layer, embodying code, is law. See Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 6 (1999).
146. See RFP, supra note 15, at 17. 147. JonathanF. P. Rose, The Well-Tempered City: What Modern Science, Ancient Civilizations, and Human Nature Teach Us About the Future of Urban Life 138 (2016) (identifying several levers of city control: "vision of the city; a master plan for how to implement the vision, with specific indicators of its components; data collection so that the city has intelligence about its circumstances and can create feedback mechanisms to [achieve like any company in this position, may be able to exert significant control over how all are conducted, with no credible social license for doing so.
Planning
Simply by wielding the "pen" in designing the master plan for Toronto's new neighborhood, Sidewalk has exercised a significant public planning function. Many cities have "digital master plans"148 or "smart city" plans that are city-led.149 The city and its residents identify the problems and define the solution space. With Sidewalk Toronto, by contrast, Sidewalk defines the problems and the solutions that Alphabet companies, it seems, will be uniquely positioned to supply. Sidewalk may design the arena for its own advantage and then play in it as a real property "vertical developer,"150 as a digital layer (perhaps sole-source) vendor, and as an infrastructure owner.151
Though Sidewalk boasted that it undertook unprecedented public engagement in the lead-up to the MIDP-consulting "literally 20,000 people"152-the detailed chronology set out in Part I above shows that the public and responsible authorities were blocked from the real action. The Framework Agreement, which governed the first nine-and-a-half months of the deal, was pushed through the WT board without enabling time for deliberation, consensus, or amendment. City councilors and citizens were not shown the agreement until it was obsolete, replaced by a new agreement, the PDA. Again, that agreement was formed in private, ushering in facts on the ground without public deliberation or engagement. It is difficult to know where to anchor serious scrutiny. On one day, Sidewalk dumped into the public realm two privately formed final agreements, problematic and unanticipated terms for ongoing procurement and intellectual property management, data governance nostrums, as well as sweeping design fantasies.153 And then there was the mystification of scope. For at least fifteen months, the project partners framed the scope of the project as being principally about Quayside, a relatively modest twelve-acre waterfront site.
its vision]; regulations, such as zoning and budding codes; incentives, inchiding tax credits and loan guarantees; and investments in infrastructure such as transportation, water, and sewer systems" In February 2019, however, it became apparent that the project really concerned the entire 880-acre waterfront stretch, which confirmed critics' and cynics' worst suspicions.154 Meanwhile, the city and its citizens would have to wait for at least another eighteen months for the release of the MIDP, a document that would ultimately run over 1500 pages155 and was negotiated in secret along the lines of the earlier agreements. While concerns about data governance and privacy were constantly volleyed between critics and defenders of the deal, these merely served to embed a sense of inevitability about the problematic aspects being examined here involving privatization, platformization, and domination. At no point was there any capacity, either at the government level or within the processes of the project partners themselves, to surface and protect against any of these areas of concern.
The privatization of planning proceeds apace as the imagined city develops. In Sidewalk's vision, the networked neighborhood is continuously planned even after the arena is built and the game is underway. Digital layer data will enable ongoing modeling of urban infrastructure needs. Indeed, Sidewalk envisions a "[m]odel component. . . [that] can simulate 'what if scenarios for city operations to inform long-term planning decisions."156 Given the amount of data that Sidewalk is likely to have, its planning tools will have significant advantages over competitors and almost certainly boost Sidewalk's prospects as a planner. It seems likely that the model will be implemented by the Sidewalk affiliate Replica. This tool creates data facsimiles of real populations by scrambling the personal data of real people into synthetic copies of "virtual" individuals.157 Replica has already proven to the satisfaction of one jurisdiction that its technology is without peer, having won a sole-source contract with the state of Illinois 
Regulation and Enforcement
As discussed in Part I above, Sidewalk's development of a data governance regime for Quayside provoked criticism that policymaking was being privatized without the normal process of hearings, open records, and accountability.159 This private lawmaking could become harder to see, but no less pronounced, after ground is broken and control moves to the "cloud" of data flows. Control of data and data analytics confers regulatory power: permissions to and prohibitions against. The digital layer, if realized according to Sidewalk's vision, effectuates permissions and prohibitions, including those governing curbside parking and driving speeds, in all cases dynamic and demand-based.160 Such agility will require highly responsive and mutable law that leaves the details of "saying what the law is" and, perhaps even of enforcement, to the platform. Land use and trash regulation provide two examples.
When it comes to land, traditional Euclidean zoning deploys bureaucratic codes to specify distinct land uses, geographically separated, in order to limit negative externalities imposed on neighbors.161
Sidewalk envisions something different on the future waterfront: an "outcome-based code to govern the built environment."162 The code would consist of "a new set of simplified, highly responsive rules that focus more on monitoring outputs than broadly regulating inputs."163 Land would not be zoned for residential or manufacturing purposes but instead opened up to flexible use, provided that the use does not exceed some measure of impact (e.g., noise, smoke, traffic) outside the "envelope" of exclusivity. This vision of patrolling dynamically for negative externalities, rather than zoning for compatible uses, requires performance targets and "embedded sensing for real-time monitoring." Sidewalk nominates itself to develop this system of "automated regulation." Sidewalk's procurement and development proposals put it in limina between the regulated and regulator and its automated zoning is ruled coUected from individual for months at a time, anowing for a complete picture of individual travel patterns") According to the notice, the estimated award for providing this data over thirty-six months is US$3.6 million. Id. 159. See Governing by Mercenary, supra note 62 ("Instead of debating, say a data and privacy policy in Cabinet or municipal government, then pitching it through the media, debating it in the legislature, voting on it, recording that vote for the next election, then entrenching it in statute and regulations; instead of all that (aka democracy).... The mercenary just gets the job done, and gets paid. There is no vote, no debate, no statute, no regulation, no accountability.").
160. This is a general aspiration of smart city development. See Rose, supra note 147, at 151 (noting that the smart city "may tune its zoning code, infrastructure investments, and incentives in real time for public benefit"). by public law.164 At the same time, it may enjoy "substantial forbearances from existing laws and regulations."165 The distance between regulation and enforcement can be short in an automated system. Sidewalk claims that the outcome-based code "will reward positive behaviors and penalize negative ones."166 What sort of process will there be around penalties? Will outcomes simply be chosen by majority rule, dependent on constant connectivity and prompts?167 Will the government have the opportunity to set enforcement priorities? Dystopic visions abound of a new cannon of "personalized law,"168 adjoined to constant surveillance or what Rob Kitchin calls "control creep" and "anticipatory governance."169 Landlords in some cities are already taking advantage of smart apartments to remotely lock out tenants over alleged contractual violations.170 Might these private dispute resolutions, which complement or replace public ordering, be outsourced to the digital layer? And if they are, who will control the lawmaking resident in the code? Sidewalk's command of the early stage of development suggests an answer.
Another example, this time in trash disposal regulation, shows that even if the government sets regulatory standards and enforces them, control over data can serve a de facto private lawmaking function. Sidewalk expects to "deploy a digitally enabled smart chute system that will help pay-as-youthrow waste regimes succeed in multifamily buildings by making it possible to differentiate between recyclables and trash."171 In other words, the data 171. See Vision, supra note 131, at 22. Elsewhere, Sidewalk Labs says that the only sensors it "expects to deploy include (1) air quality sensors (carbon monoxide, particulate matter, sulfur dioxide); (2) noise level sensors (noise generated by vehicles, construction, human activity); (3) radar, laser rangefinding, and computer vision (flow of vehicles, cyclists, pedestrians, state of the urban environment); and (4) hyperlocal weather (temperature, wind speed, humidity)." Id. at 72. The development of Replica, however, shows that intensive location tracking is also within view. about disposal patterns-some of it invariably sensitive and revealing172will be used to meter disposal fees. This data may be combined with other personal data to "nudge" individual consumption and disposal habits and might become what Karen Yeung has called a "hypemudge."173 Sidewalk will apparently control this sensor-based chute data. City officials will access this data through an app, like any other user. The city, in this vision, is reduced to a client. It stands in the shoes of the third-party app developer, with no greater access or authority than any other player.174
C. Platformization
Sidewalk's vision raises another consequential concern for urban governance that is harder to define: these are the issues inherent in a city-asplatform model that radically unbundles systems, spaces, and services into sets of transactions optimized according to market logic. The model has been theorized as a way of using public data to catalyze economic activity and improve city services.175 In broad strokes, there are two distinct versions of platform values. In one version, the city intermediates between the public's data and service providers, prioritizing public benefit. In the other, commercial platforms like Facebook and Uber intermediate, prioritizing profit or market share. Sidewalk obscures just which version of platform its digital layer will be and what it will be optimized for.
The primary function of Sidewalk's digital layer is to "collect^ data on the urban environment via sensors."176 Who is doing the collecting is left vague. In some iterations, the disembodied platform is itself the agent. It "detects pedestrian congestion," for example, and then it "can experiment with ways to create better pedestrian flow."177 This suggests that maybe the platform will be public in some sense, like basic infrastructure, and commercial entities will access it from the edge. Elsewhere, Sidewalk itself claims agency. It is Sidewalk that will "experiment. . . with various weather mitigation strategies . . . [and] get real-time feedback . . . from a high-density mesh of sensors . . . [to] enable the real-time evaluation of different interventions."178 In this case, it seems that the platform will be commercial. Commercial entities, or at least Sidewalk, will provide the utility. When a company is allowed to deploy sensors in exchange for feeding the data to the city, the city's access to that data depends on the continuation of the deal. LinkNYC kiosks allow Sidewalk to gather environmental data the city needs "to meet public health regulations and figure out the 'livability' of streets" in exchange for giving the company "a playground Crucially, ambiguity about the platform depoliticizes questions of planning, frustrates accountability, and removes points of entry for citizen contestation. Because the digital layer is conspicuously designed with the internet as a model, it seems only appropriate to extrapolate platform values from existing digital platforms. Chief among them are efficiency and datafication, both of which are problematic as foundational values for cities and urban life.
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Efficiency
The presentation of the digital layer in Sidewalk's vision demonstrates something of the nonchalant "no worries" assurances of neutrality that accompanied the rollout of information platforms in the early 2000s. Tarleton Gillespie points out that the metaphor of the platform as a "raised level surface" abets the claim of neutrality.179 But platforms are not neutral. 180 Online platforms "intervene in and reshape value regimes and economies."181 They advance a substantive vision of the good-whether that is "engagement" on social media or cheap rides through Uber-and enforce that vision through data flows.182 Similarly, smart city technologies might be "portrayed and positioned as technical, pragmatic, common-sensical, and non-ideological," but in reality, they "are inherently politically and ideologically loaded in vision and application, reshaping in particular ways how cities are managed and regulated."183
To be sure, Sidewalk's vision aims to hit ambitious targets for affordable housing, sustainability, inclusion, and other public goods. 184 These are values imposed from outside the platform, congruent with Sidewalk's ambitions to build in Toronto an idealized prototype, uninhibited by revenue demands and supported by patient capital. But the values structurally embedded in the platform are not these. The city as platform privileges efficiency.185 In Sidewalk's vision, living, working, and moving-and, as discussed in the previous section, governing-are all modules on a platform connecting users to services through data. Here is where Sidewalk's definition of "urban data" (i.e., data collected in a physical space in the city) comes into its own and has its most pernicious effects. Essentially, apart from completely personally owned spaces and devices-an increasing rarity in the envisioned waterfront-all places become exposed and marketized. Formerly static assets-whether that is park space, curb space, marketspace, office space, or housing space-are provided "as a service," just-in-time, according to usage needs.186 Planning is a continuous process that happens in real time in response to flows of urban data, so that urban resources are allocated to entertainment, quiet reflection, food trucks, cycling, or housing based on constantly refreshing data inputs about demand, possibly filtered through the profit motive of platform players.
As Adam Greenfield has observed, platform technics reduce friction between impulse and consumption.187 The ease of platform-mediated consumption can "short-circuit the process of reflection that stands between one's recognition of a desire and its fulfillment via the market."188 It is possible that the demand the platform registers should not be gratified upon considered reflection or upon considering the collective good. If we imagine that in any given moment, there is more demand to play soccer in a field than to reseed it, the platform will deliver soccer. If there is more demand (measured by those placing the most orders) for instant drone delivery than for a walk to the comer shop, retail will succumb. This is the continuous planning process that currently favors cheap ride-shares over public transportation. A brutally efficient demand-driven city-as-platform model might perhaps be able to accommodate public interests by accounting for negative and positive externalities in the model (e.g., congestion pricing). For this to happen, regulators and coders would have to collaborate. The studied ambiguity of Sidewalk Toronto about agency in the digital layer, https://medium.com/sidewalk-toronto/quayside-a-new-vision-for-torontos-waterfront-60d969dl6c5f [https://perma.cc/A4W3-2YU5].
185. See Kitchin, supra note 117, at 113-27. 186. See Vision, supra note 131, at 18 (describing "mobility as a service"); see also id. at 19 ("Sidewalk also will pilot a public realm management system, enabled by sensor arrays, that monitors air quality, asset conditions, and usage, helping managers respond quickly to emerging needs, from broken benches to overflowing waste bins. This system will enable tests of reservable outdoor spaces for short-term uses, such as pop-up shops. Using flexible building structures, Sidewalk is exploring a next-gen bazaar, a tech-enabled makerspace with activity stalls that can be refreshed quickly").
187. Adam Greenfield, Radical Technologies: The Design of Everyday Life 36 (2017).
188. Id. (discussing "the colonization of the domestic environment by . . . networked products and services").
Datafication
coupled with the embrace of privatized regulation, undermines confidence that such a collaboration would work in the public interest.
Platform discourse tends to avoid the tensions between the public interest, on one side, and efficiency or market value on the other. It fuses them. Jose van Dijck observes that, "[i]n the platform society, the creation of public value toward the common good is often confused with the creation of economic value serving a nondescript amalgam of private and public interests."189 Sidewalk incorporates public value concepts, leaning on Jane Jacobs's vision of "placemaking" along with new urbanism and sustainability. Sidewalk says it wants to pursue "[s]ocial cohesion and civic engagement."190 These are the public values exogenous to the platform. But the method offered to attain these values is always and only digital connectivity-the platform. Again, if the digital layer is controlled by the public or their representatives, according to public standards, checks, and balances, it could conceivably be optimized for the public interest. But if controlled by Sidewalk or other commercial vendors, it will most likely be optimized for efficiency and the efficient production of material value.
Platforms designed for efficiency break down the material and social world into data flows. All activities-work, leisure in public, leisure in private, transport-are part of the flow. The built environment will facilitate the data flow and be constructed by it. If allowed to, platforms will try to parse every bit of existence into data. This kind of datafication has prosocial and antisocial implications.
On the "pro" side, structures "optimized for optionality"191 create flexibility in urban shelter. Sidewalk depicts lofts that are designed to park cars until such time as autonomous vehicles reduce the demand for parking; thereafter they can be repurposed, floor-by-floor, pod-by-pod, for residential or other use. Such "radical mixed-use"192 can in theory create more affordable housing and "incremental real estate value."193 In addition, the "radical sharing of durable goods,"194 like cars, home appliances, and tools, can, again in theory, improve efficiency and reduce resource use.
On the "anti" side, the atomization of space into modules for work and sleep enacts a new scheme of value extraction in space that can effectuate "the extension of economic rationality into every comer of human life. "195 Whatever can be counted can be turned into data to facilitate exchanges and to justify total oversight of the expenditure of time. Sidewalk imagines Toronto's future waterfront as a place that has eliminated "the divide between home, work, and play."196 As sensors fill the home and cover the body, market logic may penetrate into the crevices and core of private life. It is one thing to pay a trash disposal fee. But the conversion of all relationships (even if just to things) to an infinite set of use-based, chargeable events means that every interaction is monitored, measured, and marketized.197 When nothing is owned but only leased on a fractional, per-use basis,198 gone is the freedom and tolerance to gift or to over-and underuse,199 to avoid near-perfect price discrimination,200 or to have a reasonably exercisable "freedom to be off'to be "free from systemic, environmentally architected human engineering. "201 This kind of "just-in-time" resource allocation will have a particular cast. It will be very responsive to inputs that are easily measured, to demands easily expressed in real time, and to desires that can be monetized. However, some data that should be used as an input will not be counted in part because the people or places are not instrumented. Shannon Mattern asks in connection with another smart city project, "[w]hat about all those potential behaviors that are never enacted, and thus never measured, because the physical space or its regulation prohibits them-or because one's subjectivity proscribes a repertoire of possible behaviors?" 202 The existence of data divides203-people whose data are not counted-will inflect datafication with inequality.
The efficiency gains to be extracted from "radical" mixed-use may be radically offset in other ways. First, the reliance on real-time and constant data flows, data management, and computationally intensive infrastructure is clearly not costless in terms of energy.204 Reliability and maintenance impose other costs.205 And the impact is not only material-in a state of total digital dependence, internet connectivity as well as hardware and software maintenance becomes more than an annoyance and a forbearance; it becomes critical to life quality and sustenance. Second, there are the practical implications of mixed-use and sharing, which reflect in many ways the realities that motivate private ownership and responsibility arrangements. Whole new systems and structures, likely onerous in surveillance and enforcement capacity, are required to manage, clean, maintain, and secure the spaces and things that are subject to radical sharing practices,206 which create attendant and novel challenges.207
D. Domination
Ben Green writes that the "architecture of the smart city is a fundamentally undemocratic one" because the technologies "create massive information and power asymmetries that favor governments and companies over those they track and analyze, breeding impotence and subjugation."208 The privatization and platformization risks we discuss above can be sources of subjugation for the individual and the collective. Here, we address how an ambitious smart city project like Sidewalk Toronto can neuter the city's sovereign powers, using die examples of domination through rights-of-way and tech interfaces.
The risks of domination are much higher when the smart city architect is as dominant in data as Alphabet and its principal moneymaker, Google.209 see also Google that now occupies a type of informational right to the city, and it will be Google that can increasingly control a city's surplus production or best further their own vision and ideology Its ability to sink patient capital into infrastructure and other loss leaders allows it to wait out potential competitors, leverage the network effects of affiliated services, and close off opportunities for citizens or cities to opt out of emerging technology systems. Sidewalk Toronto generates "techlash," the remonstrance against the power of big tech, primarily because it is an Alphabet-Google project.210 Indeed, Sidewalk Toronto is a perfect storm for techlash, involving as it does issues of data governance, surveillance, efficiency optimization, information asymmetries, privatization, and hidden agendas. The project feeds anxiety over domination by large, unaccountable big data systems and the asymmetric knowledge they produce.
Rights-of-Way
The right-of-way is a precious "natural" urban resource. We do not here rely on the fine points of Canadian law regarding cities' proprietary interests in these rights-of-way but rather on the general legal principle derived from Roman law that cities manage public ways (owning them in fee or as easements) for the benefit of the community.211 It is a principle recognized by Canadian courts212 alongside American ones.213 Smart city developers require access to public streets, sidewalks, underground and overhead conduits, and pole installations to support platform services and underlying connectivity. If a developer can dominate the city's right-of-way and franchising or licensing process, it can in effect plunder this resource and subvert the public trust.
Sidewalk imagines the digital layer as a great public infrastructure project in the tradition of the aqueducts of Rome, the London Underground, and the street grid of Manhattan 214 The city's role and the public's stake in this infrastructure is not clear, as discussed above. The immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.").
214. See Vision, supra note 131, at 17.
predominates. There will be a "key investment... to create a system of utility channels to accommodate all networked utilities . . . [to] provide space for electric wires, telecom conduits, and water and district heating pipes, as well as space for small-scale robots to travel between building basements and under walkable streets."215 Questions abound about whose investment this will be (Sidewalk likes to speak of ^catalyzing the financing" of such a project, with an expectation of a "reasonable" return),216 the role of Googleaffiliated companies, and control of the utility channel. Then there is the question of how those "utility" companies will interact with urban rights-ofway. Some cautions emerge from another experimental Google project in North America. Google Fiber, now under the umbrella of Alphabet's Access division, is, like Sidewalk, one of the Google-Alphabet empire's "big bets." This means it is a company with the patient capital to test and scale a technology without having to be financially successful. In 2010, Google Fiber announced, with its signature primary color cheer, a competition that sent American cities scrambling 217 It would lay gigabit fiber in some number of lucky cities. Like Sidewalk, Google Fiber offered cities the prospect of innovative services and plaudits. There were similar appeals to the prosocial advantages of the technology rollout. City managers were invited to "imagine sitting in a rural health clinic, streaming three dimensional medical imaging over the web . . . [o]r collaborating with classmates around the world while watching live 3-D video of a university lecture."218 There were also promises to advance what was the progressive tech policy agenda du jour: net neutrality. Google Fiber promised it would build an '"open access' network. . . [operated] in an open, nondiscriminatory and transparent way."219 As with Sidewalk Toronto, there was no clear revenue model.220 As some fear will happen with Sidewalk Toronto, Google Fiber's public-minded language about building a utility faded into the reality of a consumer product offered to the rich 221 215 " wanted an unrealistic rate of return on basic infrastructure" and lost patience, moving from characterizing its project as "an 'experiment' (2010), then a 'business' (2012), and finally a 'bet' or 'moonshot' (2015)"). 221. Id. ("The company inadvertentiy made plain the problem of treating internet access like any other demand-prompted product, when its Kansas City installations failed to cross amazing different with a Google executives "employed the construction of the railroads in the 1800s as a metaphor for the growth, innovation and transformation that Google Fiber would provide" to residents.23O These benefits, they promised, would extend to low-income communities. As it turned out, a demand-based model meant that only the wealthier neighborhoods signed up in sufficient numbers for the service. While nominally making the service available to underserved communities, Google in fact did not deploy the service where consumer "demand" lagged.230 231 Nor did it retain its commitment to the most robust expression of net neutrality principles. 232 The analogy to railroad rights-of-way may have been more apt than Google realized. To be sure, railroads spurred economic dynamism. They also used these gains to seize territorial and financial concessions from government. 233 In the end, Kansas City did get better broadband but not all that was promised. Its local paper editorialized ruefully: "Google Fiber hasn't changed the world, or even this part of it. That will be worth remembering the next time an technology emerges from Silicon Valley."234
Another Google Fiber city, Louisville, Kentucky, traveled a trajectory.
There, Google started experimenting in 2017 "nanotrenching" technology to see if it could cut the capital expenses of building out expensive fiber infrastructure.235 Louisville allowed the company to dig shallow trenches that barely buried the fiber. The city was so committed to the success of this new entry that it even litigated on Google's behalf against incumbent broadband providers to gain access for Google to their utility poles.236 Google's experiment ended in 2019 when it decided to leave the city-and left cracked streets and exposed conduits in its wake. 237 After public outcry, it agreed to pay the city to repair the streets. 238 What the Google Fiber experience shows is not that patient capital invested in fiber left the cities worse off than they were before (although in Louisville, it might have). It is that the investment lured the cities into precarity by giving up rights-of-way without the means to control the franchisee. Should Google Fiber have become dominant and leveraged that infrastructure to control data, wireless connectivity, and other elements of the digital layer, the cities could have not leaned on their rights-of-way to counter the dominance.
Application Interface
While land is the most tangible public resource in the Toronto smart city deployment, there is also virtual infrastructure to consider. Data is infrastructural and control over data is of central concern, as discussed above. In other cities, the application programming interface (API) is another piece of the digital infrastructure, control over which becomes an important piece of sovereignty.239 Sidewalk imagines for the Toronto waterfront an API that it would furnish to manage data access rights in the digital layer. The API would provide for "regulated access to city data and the ability to interact with the city infrastructure in ways that are safe and consistent with other uses."240 Sidewalk asserts that the API would be governed "by open standards" and support use by "third-party developers."241 In other words, the API is Android for the city.242
The two things to note about this technological arrangement are that "open" does not mean egalitarian and that "third parties" include city managers. An API owner has the final say over API use. It can withdraw access to applications that seek to connect or it can boost its own applications over those of its competitors, as Google has done.243 The digital layer, Android-esque ecosystem will seem "open." But the initial and ongoing design choices will be Sidewalk's or whoever designs it.244 As Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice Stucke write in relation to the experience with Android, Google is a "super-platform" that "can degrade the functionality of independent apps and online platforms ... by reducing their performance and making them run slower . . . foreclose [ing] . . . timely access to critical data; [or] . . . preventing [them] from achieving the minimum efficient scale," as well as by making it "harder for consumers to find" independent apps or giving "preferential treatment to its own or other competitive services."245 Using the metaphor of the savanna, they describe the dominant mode of cooperation between super-platforms, platforms, and apps in capturing user data: "They all benefit from the combined effort. But they do not share equally the spoils; the dominant lion gets the best cut, which further enhances its power." 246 Similarly, on the waterfront, Sidewalk presumably could withdraw access from or condition access to the digital layer's API. Applied to the city, API terms would influence regulatory authority. Applied to third parties, they would influence competition. For example, Sidewalk proposes to make curbside usage for parking, stopping, dining, building, or recreation available through the API. One might have thought that collecting and providing access to this data would be a quintessentially public function. But Sidewalk proposes its own "Coord" platform for this purpose.247 The data run through this platform and API would likely include personal information like license plates (to automatically regulate and enforce traffic laws), as well as de identified data for usage or vehicle type.248 In order to get at this data, and therefore enforce parking laws or grant special usage permits, the city would have to go through the API. The city, in other words, stands in the shoes of any other third party, subject to the choices of the API's owner.
Through the API deployed in Toronto's waterfront, not only will the government access the necessary data to serve citizens but citizens will access government services.249 The digital dependency discussed above comes to be a dependency on the very same tech interface that the city too requires. Citizen and city are bound together, not directly, but through mutual dependency on the same interfaces. This is the case, for example, when cities use Facebook as the principal communications forum with their residents.250 The application provider's terms of service, interconnection with other services, and technical affordances then constitute a form of urban control the city cannot easily resist.
Techniques to avoid domination by API need to be developed and built into systems of urban governance, whether these are contractual obligations, regulations, or simply alternatives.
Conclusion
In its first eighteen months of existence, the Sidewalk Toronto project did not stray from Sidewalk's original vision, notwithstanding pointed and wellpublicized public critique and revelations by a handfill of admirably aggressive local journalists. The vision has only consolidated, along with the collaboration between Sidewalk and WT, which presented a totally unified approach. Most significantly for our purposes, despite the volume of interest and intensity of concern regarding the venture, no aspect of Sidewalk's proposed vision for governance-and, in particular, no substantive aspect of data extraction, privatization, platformization, or monopolization-was aired for substantial challenge, refinement, or rescindment. Instead, there was an elaborate, performative, and painfully drip-fed process of public https://www. sidewalklabs, coni/blog/aimouncing-coord-the-integration-platform-formobility-providers-navigation-tools-and-urban-infrastructure/ [https://perma.cc/JXJ2-DL9F].
248. See Digital Strategy Advisory Panel Technology Update, supra note 174, at 13-29; Welcome-Roundtahle4: Plenary Session, Waterfront Toronto (Dec. 8, 2018), https:// storage.googleapis.com/sidewalk-toronto-ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/13210436/ online_RT4_PLENARY-Session.pdf [https://perma.cc/B47L-NVQQ].
249. See Vision, supra note 131, at 18 (explaining that each resident will be given "a highly secure, personalized portal through which residents can access public and private services").
250. City dependency on commercial social media platforms is part of what renders them basic utilities. See K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CardozoL. Rev. 1621, 1670 (2018) ("Google and Facebook are increasingly part of our informational infrastructure, shaping the distribution of and access to news, ideas, and information upon which our economy, culture, and increasingly politics depend on."). engagement,251 involving delayed information releases and staged consultations on already or nearly consummated agreements.
The net effect is that while Sidewalk's first-rate campaign to romance the city did not entirely succeed in its first stages, the project acquired global renown and a sense of inevitability, aided by a combination of lavishly funded publicity and coquettish mystery. The release of the MIDP at the end of the period studied was another flashy and well-orchestrated set piece, and Sidewalk has continued as of this writing to wear any critique as "incredibly robust dialogue" that helps the firm to improve.252 The success of this strategy going forward is far from given, as Sidewalk's tactics have hardened and tutored resistance to the project, leading to a growing grassroots #BlockSidewalk campaign, threats of legal action, and at least some indicators of more rigorous oversight from public officials. 253 As demonstrated in Part I, the process failures in the rollout of Sidewalk Toronto have been ample. When combined with the substantive concerns set forth in Part II, they propose to dramatically change the structure of urban life and threaten public governance. To recap the threats to governance demonstrated by Sidewalk's original vision and evidenced through the first eighteen months of the project:
(1) City planning and data management were referred to a private company that kept the public and public officials always one step or more behind the action.
(2) Notwithstanding stated deference to public bodies, the project's foundational provisions on intellectual property, data, and procurement, along with the basic blueprint, fundamentally disempower the public and serve the interests of the private company.
(3) In the city as platform model, public administration is a mere app at the edge of centralized infrastructure owned and operated by a private company.
(4) Regulation, lawmaking, and enforcement may be substantially taken over by the private company, which envisages a system of data-driven, outcome-based code that is highly personalized and dependent on a constant process of data extraction.
(5) Through platformization and the accompanying logic of efficiency and datafication, previously fixed and static assets are reconceived as "just-in time updatable devices," subject to data-enabled, single-use transactions. This logic encourages frictionless satiation of impulse, magnifies existing inequalities, and undervalues human freedom and social cohesion.
(6) Google experiments in other cities and domains teach that cities that readily hand over physical rights-of-way leave themselves servile to deeppocketed prospectors and that API control of data exchanges can augment unchecked platform power and deepen irreversible datafication.
What emerges from these points and the prior analysis is not a grievance with technology nor with urban innovation per se. It is with privatization, platformization, and domination. It is with the centrality and hugely asymmetric power of a private corporate group-Alphabet-Google, through its affiliate Sidewalk-and the control it is able to exercise over nearly every aspect of the future district.
Before the project reached this point, there might have been reasonable steps that Toronto, in conjunction with WT, could have taken to mitigate these concerns. These might have included a requirement of impact assessments on every proposed service in the project; of independent review for each service; that Sidewalk pilot innovations at Quayside or Google facilities before broader deployment; that the city itself administer any data trust functionality and approve data collection in a cautionary, stepwise manner based on evidence and necessity; that the relevant governmental process conclude its own data governance rulemaking; that any intellectual property provision properly assess the value the public is bringing and ensure a reasonable return; and that ordinary procurement procedures apply at all stages of the redevelopment.
After so much secrecy and legerdemain, these policy interventions may be too late if they leave the project's essential blueprint in place. Course corrections that are too timid and implicitly endorse and embed deep structural compromises into the heart of urban governance will drain the city of power. The alternative, for Toronto and others, is to pursue urban innovation with private partners but only in a way that rejects a central role for any one company-and certainly any role of "co-master developer." What Sidewalk has provided is a vision where its own upper hand in platform control, data governance, intellectual property, procurement, and access has at each turn an obvious and legitimate alternative: the hand of the city itself.
